Remuneration policy
The objective of DSM’s remuneration policy is to attract, motivate and retain the qualified and expert individuals that the company needs in order to achieve its strategic and operational objectives.
Labor-market peer group
In order to be able to recruit the right caliber of people for the Managing Board and to secure long-term retention of the current Board members, DSM has taken external reference data into account in determining adequate salary levels. For this purpose, a specific labor-market peer group has been defined which consists of Dutch companies that are headquartered in the Netherlands and are more or less comparable to DSM in terms of size, international scope and complexity of industrial operations.
The labor-market peer group consists of the following ten companies:
Aegon
Numico1
Akzo Nobel
Nutreco
Getronics1
Océ
Heineken
TNT
KPN
Wolters Kluwer
1 Since they are no longer listed on the stock exchange, Getronics and Numico will be eliminated from the peer group and replaced by other companies.
Professional independent remuneration experts (Towers Perrin, Amsterdam) have modified the raw data of the peer-group companies using a statistical empirical model, so as to make them comparable with a company the size of DSM, with the associated scope and responsibilities of the Managing Board. Peer-group data are updated on an annual basis.The peer group is verified by the Supervisory Board each year based on market circumstances (mergers, acquisitions) which determine the appropriateness of the composition of the labor-market peer group.
DSM operates in a competitive international industry. Therefore, DSM will also closely monitor industry and company-specific international developments with respect to remuneration.
Below, the various remuneration components are addressed separately.
Base salary
On joining the Board, the Managing Board members receive a base salary that is comparable with the median of the labor-market peer group. Every year base-salary levels are reviewed. Adjustment of the base salary is at the discretion of the Supervisory Board, which takes into account external and internal developments.
Bonus
Managing Board members can earn a bonus amounting to 60% of their annual base salary for on-target performance. Under the bonus plan, the part of the bonus that is related to financial targets amounts to 42% of base salary, which can increase to 63% in the case of an exceptionally good financial performance.
The part of the bonus that is not related to financial targets amounts to 18% of the base salary and cannot increase beyond that. Targets are defined in the areas of the company’s strategic development and Triple P.
Bonus part linked to financial targets
Besides the CFROI, the part of the bonus that is linked to financial targets includes elements related to operational performance, being operating profit (EBIT) and net cash, reflecting short-term financial results. The weighting given to the individual financial elements in the bonus is as follows: CFROI 21%, operating profit 12% and net cash 9% of annual base salary for on-target performance.
Targets
On-target pay-out (% of base salary)
Maximum pay-out (% of base salary)
 
 
 
Financial targets:
 
 
- CFROI
21.0
31.5
- Operating profit
12.0
18.0
- Net cash
9.0
13.5
 
 
 
Non-financial targets
18.0
18.0
 
 
 
Total
60.0
81.0
CFROI
The definition of CFROI has been established in such a way that the realization of the CFROI target can be derived from the financial information in the annual report. The definition is as follows
1
.
CFROI focuses on value realization and creation compared with the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) established for DSM.
Operational performance
There are two financial-target-related bonus elements that allow for a focus on short-term operational targets: operating profit and net cash. These can be derived from the financial statements and are defined as follows:
Targets are determined each year by the Supervisory Board, based on historical performance, the operational and strategic outlook of the company in the short term and expectations of the company’s management and stakeholders, among other things. The targets contribute to the realization of the objective of long-term value creation.
In determining the realization of the operating-profit target, a (partial) adjustment mechanism for sensitivity to the euro/dollar ratio will apply. The company does not disclose the actual targets, as they qualify as commercially sensitive information.
Stock incentives
The Managing Board members are eligible to performance-related stock options and shares. Both stock options and performance shares operate on the basis of the same performance schedule.
The vesting of stock options and performance shares is conditional on the achievement after three years of previously determined target levels of total shareholder return (TSR) compared to the peer group.
The chairman will receive 10,000 performance shares and 37,500 performance options; the members of the Board will receive 8,000 performance shares and 30,000 performance options.
Exercise price
The stock options and shares are granted on the first 'ex-dividend' day following the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders at which DSM's financial statements are adopted. The exercise price of the stock incentives is equal to the opening price of the share on the date of grant at Euronext Amsterdam.
TSR as a performance measure
DSM’s TSR performance is compared to the average TSR performance of a set of pre-defined peer companies.
The TSR peer group for 2007 consists of the following companies:
Akzo Nobel
ICI1
BASF
Lanxess
Ciba
Lonza Group
Clariant
Novozymes
Danisco
Rhodia
EMS Chemie Holding
Solvay
1 ICI will be eliminated from the peer-group because the company is no longer listed.
The peer group used for benchmarking total-shareholder-return performance reflects the relevant market in which DSM competes for shareholder preference­. It includes sector-specific competitors that the Supervisory Board considers to be suitable benchmarks for DSM.
The peer group is verified by the Supervisory Board each year based on market circumstances (mergers, acquisitions) that determine the appropriateness of the composition of the performance peer group. Depending on DSM’s performance compared to the peer group a certain number of options will become exercisable and a certain number of shares will be unconditionally awarded. The stock options can be kept for a maximum of eight years (including the three-year vesting period) while the shares shall be retained by the members of the Managing Board for a period of at least five years (after the three-year vesting period) or at least until termination of employment if this period is shorter. The final performance of DSM versus its peers will be determined and validated by a bank and audited by the external auditor at the end of the performance period.
Performance incentive zone
The number of options and shares that become unconditional after three years is determined on the basis of DSM’s performance relative to the average TSR performance of the peer group. The difference between DSM’s performance and the peer group’s performance (in percentage points) determines the vesting.
The following table gives an overview of the vesting conditions.
DSM performance minus peer-group performance in % points
Percentage of performance-related stock options that become exercisable and percentage of shares awarded
 
 
≥ 20
100
> 10 and < 20
75
> (10) and < 10 (target)
50
> (20) and < (10)
25
≤ (20)
0
Pensions
The members of the Managing Board are participants in the Dutch pension fund Stichting Pensioenfonds DSM Nederland (PDN). PDN operates similar pension plans for various DSM companies. The pension provision of the Managing Board is equal to the pension provision for the employees of DSM Limburg BV and DSM Executive Services BV employed in the Limburg area.
Employment contracts
Term of employment
The employment contracts of the members of the Managing Board appointed before 1 January 2005 have been entered into for an indefinite period of time. Newly appointed members of the Managing Board are also offered an employment contract for an indefinite period of time. The employment contract ends on the date of retirement or by notice of either party.
Term of appointment
Members of the Managing Board appointed before 1 January 2005 have been appointed for an indefinite period of time. New members of the Managing Board (appointed after 1 January 2005) will be appointed for a period of four years as Board Member. Newly appointed members are subject to reappointment by the shareholders after a period of four years.
Notice period
Termination of employment by a member of the Managing Board is subject to three months’ notice. A notice period of six months will for legal reasons be applicable in the case of termination by the company.
Severance arrangement
There are no specific contractual exit arrangements for the members of the Managing Board appointed before 1 January 2005. Should a situation arise in which a severance payment is appropriate for these Board members, the Nomination & Remuneration Committee will recommend the terms and conditions. The Supervisory Board will decide upon this, taking into account usual practices for these types of situations, as well as applicable laws and corporate-governance requirements.
The employment contracts of newly appointed members of the Managing Board (appointed after 1 January 2005) include an exit-arrangement provision which is in accordance with best-practice provision II.2.7 of the Dutch corporate-governance code (that is, a sum equivalent to the fixed annual salary, or if this is manifestly unreasonable in the case of dismissal during the first term of office, two times the fixed annual salary).